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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Utah Supreme Court held on the original de-
cision in this case that Worthen vs. Shu,rtleff and An-
drews, 19 Utah P. 2d 223, should not be applied retro-
2 
actively to govern cases that occurred prior to the deci-
sion in Worthen. Respondents and amicus curiae have 
petitioned for rehearing. 
DECISION ON ORIGINAL HEARING 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the decision in 
Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, 19 Utah P. 2d 223, 
should not be applied retroactively to govern cases that 
occurred prior to the decision in Worthen. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
The appellants agree with the statement of facts 




THERE IS NO MERIT TO PETITIONERS' PRI-
MARY ARGUMENTS FOR REHEARING: i.e., THAT 
THE INSTANT DECISION IS UNFAIR; ILLOGI-
CAL; DISCRIMINATORY, ARBITRARY, AND UN-
JUST; DENIES THE RESPONDENTS E Q UAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAW; AND DENIES THE 
RESPONDENTS UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE 
LAW. 
3 
The respondents and amicus curiae have urged many 
"points" in their briefs for granting a rehearing. They 
have argued primarily that the decision in the instant 
case is: (1) unfair; (2) illogical; (3) discriminatory, 
arbitrary and unjust; (4) denies the respondents equal 
protection of the law; and ( 5) denies the respondents 
uniform operation of the law. The theory underlying 
all the points is the philosophy, first promulgated by 
Socrates, that persons in equal situations should be 
treated equally. They argue that the respondents in this 
case are similarly situated to plaintiff Worthen in the 
case of Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrew, 19 Utah P. 2d 
223. Thus, they urge that to apply different law to the 
respondents would be unfair, illogical, discriminatory, 
arbitrary and unjust; and it denies the respondents equal 
protection and uniform operation of the law. In this 
reply brief, appellant will treat all these points together 
as the same rationale and law applies. 
Inasmuch as none of these points was raised prior 
to the petition for rehearing, the court should refuse to 
consider them. See People v. Tidwell, 5 Utah 88, 12 Pac. 
638; Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 Pac. 716; 
Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 170 Pac. 744; Dahlquist 
v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 52 Utah 438, 174 Pac. 833; Pin-
gree National Bank of Ogden v. Weber County, 54 Utah 
599, 183 Pac. 334; Western Securities Co. v. Silver King 
Cousd Min. Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664; e.g.; In re 
Lowe's Estate, 68 Utah 49, 249 Pac. 128. 
4 
Although new points may not be urged for the first 
time on rehearing, see cases cited, sitpra, respondent 
is not content to rely on this general rule for denial of 
rehearing but desires to go further and point out the 
fallacy underlying petitioners' rationale. 
Petitioners urge that the refusal to apply the 
lVorthen case retroactively denies their constitutional 
rights - the right to equal protection of the law and 
the right to uniform oeration of the law. However, in the 
same brief, petitioners cite Great Northern R. Co. v. The 
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 in which the 
United States Supreme Court held that the retroactive 
question does not raise a constitutional issue. See also 
Tehan v. the U.S. ex, rel, Shott, 382 U.S. 406. Mr. Justice 
Cardoza in the Sunburst case, supra, stated: 
"This is a case where a court has refused to 
make its ruling retroactive, and the novel stand is 
taken that the constitution of the United States 
is infringed by the refusal. vV e think the federal 
constitution has no voice upon the subject. A 
state is defining the limits of adherence to precec. 
dent may make a choice for itself between the 
principle of forward operation and that of relation 
backward. It may say that decisions of its highest 
court, though later overruled, are law none the 
less for intermediate transactions. . . . As applied 
to each transaction we may say of the earlier 
decision that it has not been overruled at all, ... 
that transactions arising in the future will be 
governed by different rule. . . . The alternative 
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is the same whether the subject of the decision is 
common law or statute. The choice for any state 
may be determined by the judicial philosophy of 
judges of her courts .... 
Mr. Justice Cardoza's rationale was recently affirmed 
in United States Supreme Court in the case of Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 wherein Mr .• Justice Clark 
stated: 
"We believe that the constitution neither pro-
hibits nor requires retrospective effect .... 
[W] e are neither required to apply nor pro-
hibited from applying decisions retroactively ... 
we but apply the wisdom of Justice Homes - that 
the life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience." 
The briefs urging rehearing, although short on au-
thority are lengthy on argument and analogies, i.e., peti-
tioners argue that the present decision makes the outcome 
of a case depend upon "a race to the court house" or 
upon some deputy clerk's "jockeying" the court calendar. 
It is difficult, however, to see the applicability of peti-
tioners' argument in view of the lengh of time - years 
- they waited to present their claims in the instant case. 
But petitioners argue that since they are in essentially 
the same position as Worthen it is unfair, discriminatory, 
arbitrary, and unjust to give different results to them 
than to Worthen, just because ·w orthen presented his 
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claim first. However, this argument is a two-edged 
sword. For example, the compensation carrier in the 
Worthen case was in the identical situation as the State 
Insurance Fund in McConnell v. Commission of Finance, 
13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P. 2d 394. Under petitioners' ra-
tionale, Worthen must have been improperly decided as 
it applied different law to two similarly situated insur-
ance carriers and, thus, was discriminatory, unfair, arbi-
trary, etc. (See Mr. Justice Henroid's dissent in the 
Worthen case.) The logical result of petitioners' rationale 
is that there could never be overruling precedent inas-
much as every case overruling another case applies dif-
ferent law to the same facts. Following petitioners' 
rationale further, since plaintiff McConnell in the 111 c-
Connell case is in the same position as Worthen and the 
respondents herein, he should now be allowed recovery. 
Thus, petitioners' rationale not only prevents growth in 
the law and the overruling of erroneous precedent, but 
also does away with the doctrine of res judicata. 
Although petitioners' rationale (persons in equal 
situations should be treated equally) is emotionally 
appealing, it is rather naive. It only looks to one interest 
of the law; i.e., equity. However, the law has o,ther, 
equally important interests. The law must grow; it must 
meet the exigencies of the times; and must also overrule 
erroneous decisions. While the law should attempt to 
treat persons in equal positions equally, it must also be 
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stable, predictable and final. As Rosco Pound stated: 
"Law must be stable, yet it cannot stand still." Interpre-
tations of Legal Histories, (1923) page 1. Sometimes 
these important legal goals conflict, such as when prece-
dent is overruled. The courts cannot allow the goal of 
stability to prevent correction of erroneous precedent. 
Yet, when precedent is overruled, courts cannot allow 
the goal urged by petitioners, to disrupt justifiable expec-
tations and relations entered into in reliance on the 
earlier precedent. Thus it is necessary to compromise 
the goals urged by petitioners with the goals of stability, 
predictability, and finality. A proper manner in which 
to balance these conflicting interests, as pointed out in 
earlier brief and done by the Supreme Court in the 
instant case is to reverse a case but refuse to apply the 
new doctrine retroactively. This has been the suggested 
procedure of Austin, Cardoza, Traynor and Bodenheimer. 
It has been approved and even recommended by the 
United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court 
in the instant case, and other state and federal courts. 
(See authorities cited in brief on original hearing.) 
POINT II 
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS THAT THE INST ANT 
CASE IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW OF LIM-
ITED RETROACTIVITY ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Petitioners urge that the Supreme Court erred m 
the instant case in applying the rule against retroactive 
effect of overruling precedent. They urge that the 
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Worthen case, in effect, applied the law retroactively 
since the facts in the Worthen case occurred prior to 
the decision. Thus, they argue that the W orthcn decision 
had, in effect, retroactive effect, and, therefore, the de-
cision in Worthen must also be applied to them. If pe-
titioners mean that the Supreme Court did not legislate 
in Worthen, i.e., applied law to fact, not jm;t to govern 
future situations, then they are correct. No doubt, each 
case decided by a court is, in a sense, retroactive inas-
much as courts must decide cases on particular fact situa-
tions that occurred. However, such logic does not dictate 
that the court must apply the new law to fact situations 
that occurred prior to the decision. As pointed out in 
earlier quotations from Mr. Justice Cardoza, the state 
courts are at liberty to determine the prospective, retro-
active or limited retroactive effect their decisions will 
have. Again, he stated: 
"A state in defining the limits of adherence 
to precedent may make a choice for itself between 
the principal of forward operation and that of 
relation backward. J t may say that decisions of 
its highest court, though later overruled, are law 
none the less for intermediate transactions. . . . 
As applied to each transaction we may say of 
the earlier decision that it has not been overruled 
at all, ... that transactions arising in the future 
will be governed by a different rule." 
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Sunburst case, supra. 
Some of respondents argue that the doctrine of lim-
ited retroactivity was improperly applied to them as the 
facts in their cases occurred subsequent to the facts in 
Worthen. However, that is unimportant as may be seen 
from the quotation above. Moreover the cut-off usually 
used by state court when applying the doctrine of limited 
retroactivity is the date of the decision. If the facts in 
the case occurred prior to the date of the overruling 
decision then the old law is applicable. (See the cases 
cited in the brief on the original appeal.) Similar cases 
have arisen with respect to the retroactivity of decisions 
doing away with governmental immunity. For example, 
in Holytz v. lllilwaukee, 17 vVis. 2d 21, 115 N.vV. 2d 618 
the \Visconsin Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of 
governmental imunimty from tort liability. However, 
in Marshall v. Greenbay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W. 2d 
715, the H olytz rule was not applied retroactively 
although the Marshall case was pending in the lower 
court on the date the H olytz case was decided. See also 
Terry v. Mount Zion Community United School District, 
30 Ill. app. 2d 307, 174 N.E. 2d 701. 
The gist of the decisions in both the original brief 
and this brief is that the state court may determine for 
itself the amount of retroactive effect an overruling 
precedent will have, and, thus, there is no mandatory 
legal requirements Consequently, the instant decision 
could not have erroneously applied the law. Moreover, 
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the manner in which the court in the instant case lim-
ited the retroactive effect of Worthen is the general way 
courts have done in the past, i.e., Worthen is controlling 
on all cases with facts arising after the date of its deci-
sion and McConnell controls cases with facts occurring 
prior to the Worthen case. Such limited retroactivity 
protects justifiable expectations and the legal goals of 
stability, predictability, and finality while allowing the 
law to grow and correct erroneous decisions. 
Respectfully submitted: 
RICHARD J. LEEDY 
Attorney at Law 
